Humans recognise and respond to robots as social agents, to such extent that they occasionally a empt to bully a robot. e current paper investigates whether aggressive behaviour directed towards robots is in uenced by the same social processes that guide human bullying behaviour. More speci cally, it measured the e ects of dehumanisation primes and anthropomorphic qualities of the robot on participants' verbal abuse of a virtual robotic agents. Contrary to previous ndings in human-human interaction, priming participants with power did not result in less mind a ribution. However, evidence for dehumanisation was still found, as the less mind participants a ributed to the robot, the more aggressive responses they gave. In the main study this e ect was moderated by the manipulations of power and robot anthropomorphism; the low anthropomorphic robot in the power prime condition endured signi cantly less abuse, and mind a ribution remained a signi cant predictor for verbal aggression in all conditions save the low anthropomorphic robot with no prime. It is concluded that dehumanisation occurs in human-robot interaction and that like in human-human interaction, it is linked to aggressive behaviour. Moreover, it is argued that this dehumanisation is di erent from anthropomorphism as well as human-human dehumanisation, since anthropomorphism itself did not predict aggressive behaviour and dehumanisation of robots was not in uenced by primes that have been established in human-human dehumanisation research.
INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, a small cleaning robot was assigned an unsupervised job at a public square while scientists were conducting a eld experiment with a larger and more sophisticated robot nearby. However, things did not go quite as planned, as the cleaning robot was approached by random bystanders and abused -in the absence of any form of provocation from the robot. e ba ed scientists had to hastily reach for their cell phones to capture this unexpected form of human-robot interaction. Salvini et al. [53] noted that "the nature of the abuses su ered by the robots […] is much more similar to bullying behaviours than vandalism. […] In the case of urban robots, acts of vandalism could be, for instance, crashing the touch screen monitor, se ing re to the robot, or keying the robot cover. On the contrary, what we noticed during the behavioural study were actions aimed at forcing the robot to do or not to something or, in a few cases, simulations of "physical" a acks" [53, p. 371] .
Humans recognise robots as social actors. ey talk to them [4] as if they understand what is being said, they punish them when they prove to be a bad teammate [3] but also feel sorry for them when they are being punished [55] , and even try to prevent them from ge ing hurt [9, 55] . Our brain responds to robots as if they were giving o social cues; activating mirror neurons when watching a robot perform an action [18] , activating neural networks linked to the theory of mind when playing a game with a robot [30] , and activating areas associated with emotional empathy when watching a robot ge ing hurt [50] . Many studies report on how people engage in social interaction with robots [26] .
However, not all social behaviours are positive. e cleaning robot from the Salvini et al. [53] study is not alone in being abused; Brscić et al. [5] observed how kids a acked a robot that was patrolling a shopping mall. A er multiple failed a empts to design robot behaviour that could stop these aggressive tendencies, the authors had to program the robot in such a way that it simply avoided potential bullies (i.e., any kid-sized human). Of course, robots are the ideal target for bullying as they are in a clear subordinate position, will not retort in kind, and cannot feel any pain, which absolves the aggressor from any moral consequence [11] .
is is not to say that robot bullying should be tolerated. From an ethical perspective, some behaviours can be deemed immoral even if performed on a entity that is incapable of any su ering, like a robot [57] . Since the robot is recognised by the human as a social actor, abusing it might encourage treating other humanlike beings (e.g. actual humans) in a similar way [65] . More generally speaking, the assertion "I can do whatever I desire with a robot" rests upon the idea that all and any actions are acceptable as long as no-one gets harmed [48] , which even in the most libertarian societies is not a commonly shared a itude [65] . And from a pragmatic point of view, robot abuse can result in considerable damage to the robot and hazardous situations for both the robot and bystanders [11] .
Research on the reasons behind robot bullying is still sparse [10] and o en involves anecdotal observations [53] . e current paper will thus dive into the psychological motivations behind robot bullying behaviour. More speci cally, it will manipulate how humanlike a robot is perceived, using the theoretical frameworks of dehumanisation and anthropomorphism, and measure the effects of this manipulation on bullying behaviour.
e goal is to experimentally show that aggressive behaviour towards robots is a social phenomenon, and is guided by the same social processes as aggressive behaviour towards humans.
Perceiving (non)human
In 1994, Nass et al. [44] found that humans treat computers as if they are social actors; a nding that inspired his "Media Equation" theory, which states that humans will automatically respond to media as if it is real life [46] . In a series of experiments, it was shown that for well-established human interaction mechanisms, the interaction partner can be substituted with a computer without changing the behavioural outcomes. Later studies further con rmed that people interact with machines and media as if they are social agents [40] .
e Media Equation extends to robots as well. When playing a cooperative game with either a robotic or a human partner, participants apply the same social norms to both partners, punishing bad performance and rewarding good performance [3] . With increasing humanlikeness in a robot, activation of the brain regions that are associated with the theory-of-mind neural network is enhanced [30] . Moreover, seeing a robot hand carrying out a series of movements activates the same mirror neurons in the brain as observing a human hand [18] , further suggesting that the brain processes robots (to some degree) as if they are human agents.
e phenomenon of seeing human characteristics in nonhuman agents is called anthropomorphism (from the Greek words "anthropos", meaning "human", and "morphe", meaning "form"): the rst mention of the word stems from the sixth century BC [34] . Epley et al. [13] drew a motivational framework for anthropomorphism that rests on three factors. Two are human needs: the need to understand and predict the behaviour of other agents and the need to be social. e third factor is related to the agent and considers how much it resembles a human in appearance and behaviour.
Waytz et al. [64] con rmed the validity of the rst factor in the human-robot interaction eld by showing that robots behaving in an unpredictable way have higher anthropomorphism ratings. Moreover, when participants are dealing with unpredictable robots, a brain region that is involved with inferring mental states of other agents becomes activated, suggesting that the robots are indeed recognised as having a mind of their own. e second factor was con rmed when loneliness was shown to correlate with the tendency to assign a mind to interactive gadgets (like an alarm clock that "runs away" when it goes o ). Moreover, a er a feeling of loneliness was experimentally induced, participants had a greater tendency to anthropomorphise a wide range of nonhuman agents: pets, God, and a series of ambiguous drawings in which one might perceive the features of a face [12] .
Finally, the validity of the agent factor was experimentally conrmed by Eyssel et al. [14] , who showed that the relationship between psychological closeness to and the anthropomorphism of robots depends on the robots voice. When the robot had a synthesised voice, the gender of the robots voice didn't in uence anthropomorphism ratings in participants; but when it had a human voice, robots with a voice that matched the participants' gender were rated as more anthropomorphous.
e Media Equation can however not be equated to anthropomorphism completely [4] . Although humans apply social norms when interacting with a robot, they also display certain behaviours that would be unacceptable in human-anthropomorphous animal behaviour; for example, switching o the robot whenever they become bored with it. So while robots are recognised as social agents, their perceived humanlikeness is somehow di erent from the humanlikeness of anthropomorphous animals. is suggests that anthropomorphism is not a uni-dimensional construct, but involves a more complex mental process.
A related theoretical framework called mind perception provides a possible explanation. Mind perception theory states that the perception of a mind in other agents, human or not, is guided by two dimensions: Experience and Agency [19] . e rst dimension entails to what extent an agent is thought to be capable of experiencing thoughts, feelings, and the world around it. Agents who are high in Experience and low on Agency are perceived as being less responsible for their actions, more prone to feeling hurt, and thus deserving of protection. e second dimension indicates to what extent the agent is seen as capable of self control, memory, planning, and moral judgement. Beings high in Agency but low on Experience are considered to be responsible for their own actions and less deserving of protection from harm, as they don't have (a rich set of) feelings and supposedly can take care of themselves.
In the survey of Gray et al. [19] , robots scored high on Agency but low on Experience, whereas animals scored high on Experience but low on Agency (this study however stems from 2006, before the eld of social robotics took o . Robots nowadays may be seen as more capable of Experience). is would explain why robots and animals are not anthropomorphous in the same way: since robots are rated high on Agency instead of Experience, one can harm them without feeling bad [19] . Indeed, increasing Agency traits in a robot did not do much for its anthropomorphism or likeability ratings, but increasing its Experience traits resulted in it being perceived as more anthropomorphic and likeable [52, 67] .
So in general, humans perceive robots as humanlike mostly to the extent that they are independent and autonomous. But if the se ings are right, the perceived capability of a robot to fully experience the world around it can be tweaked as well. Together with the notion that bullying is a social behaviour (albeit a negative one), this suggests that in order to explain robot bullying behaviour, one should look at which psychological mechanisms come into play when humans get mean towards each other.
Humanness and aggression
e mechanisms underlying human-on-human aggression are explained in dehumanisation theory. Perceiving another as less human allows people to disregard the (negative) consequences of their behaviour and thus decreases empathy towards the victim [7, 36] . Haslam [21] de nes two sets of characteristics that determine humanness: Human Nature (HN) and Uniquely Human (UH) traits [see also 23] . UH traits and capabilities are presumably reserved for humans only, like higher forms of cognition. HN on the other hand involves traits and capabilities that are shared with other animals, but are at the same time considered fundamental to being human, like fear or joy. Perceiving less HN traits in an agent results in a 'mechanistic' form of dehumanisation; in humans, this form of dehumanisation is applied to for example bankers and businessmen. Alternatively, perceiving less UH traits results in an 'animalistic' form of dehumanisation [21, 23] ; this form of dehumanisation is commonly applied to women or the mentally disabled.
Dehumanisation can be triggered by stable factors like trait characteristics of the person who dehumanises (e.g. narcissism and conservatism) and of the victim (e.g. social class, gender); but also circumstantial factors like emotional state, a sense of power, or self-focus [22] . Interestingly, although agents high on HN traits are seen as more deserving of protection, animalistic dehumanisation is still related to a decrease in empathy [8] and both types of dehumanisation are related to increased aggression [22, 33] .
Dehumanisation theory shows considerable overlap with anthropomorphism, to the point where it has been suggested that they are two approaches of the same concept [63] . Applying this claim to research, Loughnan et al. [38] applied a dehumanisation framework on non-human agents and showed that UH traits were more readily associated with robots, while HN traits were more easily linked to animals. However, not all scholars agree that dehumanisation and anthropomorphism are each others reverse. For example, in one study neither robot appearance nor perceived intentionality in uenced the mind or moral agency a ributed to it. A more human appearance of the robot resulted in an increase in ascribed UH and HN traits; but at the same time less perceived intentionality correlated with a higher a ribution of UH traits [68] .
e inconsistency in ndings might be explained by the many di erent approaches that have been used to measure dehumanisation and anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism has been operationalised in many di erent ways by di erent researchers [27, 51] : from the humanness subscale of the revised Godspeed questionnaire [24] , which quite straightforwardly asks the participant to rate the robots on scales like 'living versus inanimate' and 'humanmade versus humanlike' [41, 67] ; to home-cra ed questionnaires [15, 49, 50] ; to mind a ribution questionnaires [12, 14, 64] and UH and HN a ribution measurements [37, 52] , which hold the (implicit) assumption of dehumanisation and anthropomorphism being each others opposite. is makes it virtually impossible to tease apart anthropomorphism, dehumanisation, and mind a ribution in the literature.
Current studies
e current studies follow a 2 (dehumanisation tendencies) x 2 (anthropomorphism of the robot) between participant design. Participants are either primed to dehumanise or receive a control task, and then engage in a scripted dialogue with a virtual NAO robot (see Figure 1 ) which is either high or low in anthropomorphism. e main dependent variable is the proportion of negative or aggressive responses compared to the number of positive interactions.
We hypothesise that participants who received a dehumanisation prime will be be more aggressive to the robot than the control group. Moreover, we expect that this e ect is stronger for a high anthropomorphic robot compared to a low anthropomorphic robot.
To manipulate dehumanisation, a feeling of power is primed in participants, as this manipulates dehumanisation tendencies [20] but not anthropomorphism [28] . Both the use of a human voice [14] and the inclusion of social cues through movement [43] have been shown to increase perceived anthropomorphism of a robot. Two questionnaires are administered at the end of the experiment as manipulation checks.
e online se ing was partly chosen because it provides easy access to an enormous pool of potential participants, but also because it reduces inhibition and self-consciousness in participants through the "online disinhibition e ect" [58] . Although on-and o ine bullying do not di er in principle, as reported by both perpetrators and victims [42] , people are more likely to bully online than o ine [39] . is is due to the invisibility and anonymity of the aggressor and victim, and the lack of bystanders who might intervene [31, 58] , among other things.
ese factors lower the threshold for interhuman aggression [62] as well as aggression towards a virtual robot [10] . It is thus assumed here that using an online platform may enhance the e ect but will not alter the nature of the factors that moderate bullying tendencies towards robots.
Similarly, interaction with a virtual robot is not fundamentally di erent from interaction with an embodied one. Previous studies have shown that virtual representations of robots elicit more social behaviour (like mimicking expressions, empathy, polite behaviour, and physiological responses) than audiotapes or text [50, 55] , indicating that virtual robots too are recognised as social agents. Li [35] conducted a meta-analysis on papers that studied the in uence of agent embodiment on users' perception of the agent, and concluded that embodied robots elicit stronger behavioural and a itudinal responses than virtual agents. However, several studies which had found no di erence in behavioural and a itudinal responses for virtual agents and physical robots were missing n this analysis [for example 45, 47] . More recent studies also found that the perception of and response to virtual agents is identical to embodied robots [59, 66] . ellman et al. [59] found that it is social presence (i.e. whether the robot is perceived as a social actor that manifests humanness [32] ) rather than physical presence that predicts the social in uence of a robot. Moreover, social presence was not in uenced by the physical embodiment of the robot in their experiment.
While the literature is still on the fence on to what extent virtual and embodied robots are interchangeable, we argue that the underlying psychological mechanisms are the same (but the intensity of the experience may or may not di er). us, while our experiment features a virtual robot in an online se ing, we feel con dent that the gist of the ndings can be applied to embodied robots too.
2 PILOT STUDY 2.1 Methods 2.1.1 Participants. Participants were approached on a number of platforms, but mainly signed up via online crowdsourcing companies CrowdFlower and Amazon Mechanical Turk. Data from these platforms has been shown to be of equal quality as on-campus recruitment or participant data from forums [2, 54] . For the current study, compliant with the common reimbursement rates on those websites, participants were paid $1.25 USD for completing the study. In addition to CrowdFlower and Amazon, the experiment was also distributed through the university Facebook page and the forum r/SampleSize on the online platform Reddit. Participants who signed up via these platforms did not get reimbursed.
232 participants completed the interaction and questionnaires. 17 participants clearly did not comply with the essay guidelines (i.e. did not write on the provided topic or copy-pasted their essay o of the internet) and were removed from the dataset. irty participants failed the a ention question and were removed as well.
e resulting dataset thus held 185 participants. 39% of them were male; the average age was 38 years (SD = 11.5); the majority listed the USA as their country of residence (66%).
Procedure.
Participants were told that the study was a pilot for evaluating a virtual robot agent that would introduce the lab robots to children. A er providing demographic information, they were asked to write a 200 word essay on either what they would do if they were president with unrestricted power for a day (power prime, dehumanisation condition) or the last time they visited a mall (control condition). is part was framed as a check of their pro ciency in English.
A er submi ing their essay, participants were reminded to turn on the sound on their device and keep it on during the whole interaction. ey were then shown a virtual environment with the robot, which introduced itself to them as one of the robots in the HITlab of the University of Canterbury.
e robot either had a humanlike voice and gave o social cues through movement (high anthropomorphism condition) or spoke with a synthesised voice and was shown in stills (low anthropomorphism condition).
Participants engaged in a scripted interaction with the robot, where they could respond to the robot by selecting either of two or three responses presented to them on the screen. Sometimes, all options were neutral, but in roughly 90% of the cases one response was positive and another negative or abusive in nature. If a positive answer option was given, there always was a negative response option as well, and vice versa.
A er the participant had selected their response, the robot would give its reaction. ese reactions di ered depending on the selected response. To ensure that the participants fully understood what the robot had said, a transcript appeared on the screen once it was done talking. Participants could also refresh the page in order to re-listen to what the robot had to say. e whole interaction took 10-15 minutes.
A er the interaction, the participants were presented with a new screen, which informed them that the interaction part was now over, and were asked to rate the virtual agent on two questionnaires (the anthropomorphism and dehumanisation manipulation check measurements). When the participants had given their opinion on the nal item, they were debriefed and asked to submit their answers to the database. […] So in spite of not being alone, it can get boring", the participant could choose between "I am sorry to hear that" and " is is stupid. You are a robot, you can't feel". Upon picking the rst response, the robot would react in a friendly way, assuring the participant it wasn't all that bad. Alternatively, if the participant chose the second option, the robot would respond in a sad and insecure manner, and change the topic.
e robot voice in the low anthropomorphism condition was generated by the text-to-speech function in the text editor so ware [25] .
e robot voice in the high anthropomorphism condition was recorded from a native English speaking student. e robots' movements in the high anthropomorphism condition were recorded from the Choregraphe simulation window [1] and edited to change the background with Adobe A er E ects [56] .
Measurements.
Aggression measurement. e proportion of negative responses was used as a measurement of aggression, and used as dependent variable in the binomial models that were de ned. Only responses where both a negative and a positive response option had been presented were taken into account.
Manipulation checks. A manipulation check was included for both dehumanisation and anthropomorphism. For the dehumanisation manipulation check, the mind a ribution scale (MAS) from Kozak et al. [29] was used. In this questionnaire participants rate to what extent the robot is capable of experiencing each of ten mental capabilities (e.g. "capability of experiencing complex feelings", "capability of engaging in planned action"). Since being capable of feelings and thoughts is central to being human [38] , dehumanisation would show in less a ributed mind to the robot.
For the anthropomorphism manipulation check, the humanlikeness subscale of the revised Godspeed questionnaire (GQ r ) [24] was used. In this questionnaire, participants rate a robot on six bipolar scales, e.g. "synthetic -real", "living -inanimate", and "without de nite lifespan -mortal". In both questionnaires, items were measured on an 11-point Likert scale.
Results
2.2.1 Reliability, randomisation and manipulation check. e reliability of both questionnaires was assessed by calculating Cronbach's alpha. e GQ r had an alpha of .83; the MAS had an alpha of .90. us, both questionnaires were considered reliable. To make interpretation easier, the full MAS was reverse-scored so that a higher score indicated a lower degree of mind a ribution and thus a higher degree of dehumanisation.
e four conditions did not di er signi cantly from each other in participants' mean age, gender, or country of residence; or with respect to the total number of interactions per participant. e groups did not di er signi cantly in sample size, χ 2 (3, N = 185) = 4.25, p = .24, with 40 participants in the low anthropomorphism/control condition, 58 in the high anthropomorphism/control condition, 45 in the low anthropomorphism/dehumanisation condition, and 42 in the high anthropomorphism/dehumanisation condition.
Participants in the high anthropomorphism condition rated their robot as signi cantly more anthropomorphous (M = 5.76, SD = 2.10) than participants in the low anthropomorphism condition (M = 4.90, SD = 2.17), F(1,181) = 6.25, p = .01, no main e ect for the dehumanisation condition or interaction term, ps > .35. Participants in the dehumanisation condition did not a ribute signi cantly less mind to their robot (M = 5.93, SD = 2.01) compared to the control condition (M = 5.78, SD = 2.27), F(1,181) = .14, p = .70, no signi cant main e ect for the anthropomorphism condition or interaction term, ps > .33. us, the manipulation of anthropomorphism had been successful, but the power prime had not led to a greater degree of dehumanisation of the robot. As it did not manipulate dehumanisation tendencies, the dehumanisation condition will from this point on be referred to as the power prime condition. e MAS scores will be used as an indication of dehumanisation instead. See Table 2 for the mean score on both questionnaires.
On average, 75% of participants' interaction paths overlapped (SD = .08%).
Main analysis.
Four binomial regression models are proposed and compared below. For all models, the dependent variable was the proportion of negative responses. e predictor variables were a composition of either or both conditions and the score on the MAS. To make interpretation easier, the scores on the MAS had been centered beforehand. Chi-square statistics are used to assess if a proposed model is be er at predicting aggressive responses than the null model (which holds no predictors). e Akaike information criterion (AIC) is used to compare the models amongst each other, with a lower AIC score indicating a be er t compared to the alternative model and a di erence (∆ AI C ) of less than 2 points indicating that the models are roughly equivalent [6] . e rst model that was put up for comparison followed the original analysis plan and had as predictors the two conditions and an interaction term. is model had no signi cant predictors, all -.85 < z < .54, all ps > .40, and it thus did not do any be er than the null model at predicting aggressive responses, χ 2 (3, N = 185) = 2.36, p = .50; AIC = 867.1. In the second model, the MAS score and power prime condition were added as predictor variables and twice each as an interaction variable.
e MAS score was the only signi cant predictor, b = .41, z = 7.88, p < .001, although an interaction between MAS and anthropomorphism approached signi cance, b = −.10, z = −1.78, p = .08. e model was a signi cant improvement over the null model, χ 2 (6, N = 185) = 163.85, p < .001; the AIC indicated a preference for the second model over the rst, AIC = 711.61, ∆ AI C = 155. 49 .
In the third model, the power prime condition was removed from the model, leaving the MAS score and the anthropomorphism condition as main e ects and interaction. In this model as well, only the MAS score predicted aggression; b = .38, z = 8.82, p < .001, although an interaction between MAS and anthropomorphism once more approached signi cance, b = −.09, z = −1.70, p = .09.
is model predicted aggressive responses signi cantly be er than the null model, χ 2 (3, N = 185) = 160.35, p < .001; the AIC di erence indicated a slight preference for the third model over the second, AIC = 709.11, ∆ AI C = 2.5.
us, a nal model was de ned containing only the MAS score as a predictor; b = .33, z = 12.04, p < .001. is model as well was signi cant, χ 2 (1, N = 185) = 157.19, p < .001; the AIC indicated it to be preferable over the second, and roughly equivalent to the third model, AIC = 708.27, ∆ AI C = 3.34 and ∆ AI C = .84, respectively.
Since model 3 and 4 t the data equally well, there is no statistical incentive to prefer one over the other. However, as the MAS score was the only signi cant predictor in model 3, Occam's razor is applied and model 4 is identi ed as the model that predicts aggressive responses best. See Table 1 for the statistics of model 1, 2 and 4 (since model 3 and 4 were very similar in their outcomes, model 3 is not included).
Discussion
Two main ndings emerged in the pilot study. Firstly, the results indicate that mind a ribution is predictive of robot bullying. e Session We-1B: Societal Issues: Abuse, Trust, Racism HRI'18, March 5-8, 2018, Chicago, IL, USA less mind is a ributed to a robot, the more aggressive responses it will get. Whether the robot was moving and talking with a human voice, or still and speaking with a computer generated voice did not have any signi cant in uence on aggression. ese ndings have a few implications. ey suggest that the relation between anthropomorphism and dehumanisation is more complicated than "two sides of the same coin". One can manipulate "aliveness" of a robot without a ecting the mind that is a ributed to it, or the bullying that it will su er.
e interaction between mind a ribution and anthropomorphism suggested that the in uence of mind a ribution might be modi ed by robot looks in such a way that mind gets less relevant as the robot looks more humanlike, but this interaction did not reach statistical signi cance. ese ndings are in line with the ndings from Zlotowski et al. [68] , who found that robot appearance does not a ect mind a ribution, and the assertion of ellman et al. [59] that the social presence of a robot, not its embodiment, is the main factor in shaping a ective and behavioural reactions.
Moreover, although power priming as a dehumanisation manipulation failed, the results indicate that human-robot aggression is related to the same psychological processes that guide humanhuman aggression. Perceiving the robot as less capable of thinking and feeling increases the number of a empts to hurt a robot, instead of taking away the incentive for bullying. Due to the study setup, a causal direction unfortunately cannot be inferred; less mind a ribution may lead to more aggression, or people may perceive a robot as being less mindful in order to justify their aggressive responses. NB: ratio is the number of negative to positive responses; data has been square root transformed to facilitate interpretation. e second main nding was the failure of the power prime. is could be taken as evidence that humans do not dehumanise robots in the same way they dehumanise humans; while aggression is related to (a lack of) mind perception, factors that in uence mind perception in fellow humans do not in uence robot mind perception. Alternatively, the manipulation method could have been biased. While power priming was copied from previous studies, where it had been an e ective method [17, 20] , the topic had not been adopted verbatim. Given that the majority of the respondents lived in the US, together with the recent developments in the oval o ce, "president for a day" seemed to have triggered more than just feelings of power. For example, some participants used the essay mainly to express their unhappiness with the current POTUS.
us, in the main experiment the design was kept identical to the pilot except for the prime. We adopted an essay topic that had been previously described [16] and established [17, 20] to manipulate dehumanisation.
MAIN STUDY
Except for the power prime, this study's design was identical to the pilot.
Methods
3.1.1 Participants. Only Amazon Mechanical Turk was used as a recruitment platform for the main study, as participants on this platform are reimbursed only a er their submi ed data has been approved, which allowed the researchers to discard participants who failed the a ention check. 129 participants completed the essay and questionnaires. Of those, 12 submi ed an essay that was either o -topic or had been copy-pasted from the internet and were removed, resulting in a dataset with 117 participants. 49% were male, the average age was 38 years (SD = 11.0), and the majority (80%) resided in the USA.
3.1.2 Procedure, materials, and measurements. e procedure was identical to the pilot study, save for the essays. In the dehumanisation condition participants now had to recall and describe in detail a personal incident in which they had power over another individual or individuals [16, 17, 20] . e visit to the shopping mall in the control condition was changed to a visit to a grocery store, as some participants in the pilot study had remarked that they hadn't been to a mall in years. e materials and measurements were identical to those used in the pilot study.
Results
3.2.1 Reliability, randomisation and manipulation check. Both questionnaires were reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .86 for the MAS; .90 for the GQ r ). e full MAS again was reverse-scored, so that a higher score indicated a higher degree of dehumanisation.
e four conditions did not di er signi cantly from each other with respect to the participants' country of residence, gender or the total number of interactions. e groups did not di er signicantly in sample size, with 28 participants in the low anthropomorphism/control condition, 25 in the high anthropomorphism/control condition, 31 in the low anthropomorphism/dehumanisation condition, and 33 in the high anthropomorphism/dehumanisation condition, χ 2 (3, N = 117) = 1.26, p = .74.
Participants' mean age di ered signi cantly between the groups, F(1,115) = 12.24, p < .001. Since age is correlated to the aggression ratio (ρ = -.15), it was included in the models as a control variable.
Participants in the high anthropomorphism condition rated their robot as signi cantly more anthropomorphous (M = 6.62, SD = 1.96) than participants in the low anthropomorphism condition (M = 5.27, SD = 2.13), F(1,113) = 8.50, p < .01, no signi cant main e ect for the dehumanisation condition or the interaction term, ps > .33. Participants in the dehumanisation condition did not a ribute signi cantly less mind to their robot (M = 5.55, SD = 2.10) compared to the control condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.86), F(1,113) = 1.01, p = .32, no main e ect for the anthropomorphism condition or the interaction term, ps > .58. us, the manipulation of anthropomorphism had been successful, but the manipulation of dehumanisation had not. e MAS was once more used as a measure of dehumanisation, and again the dehumanisation condition will be referred to as the "power prime condition" from this point on. See Table 2 for descriptives of both questionnaires.
On average, 74% of participants interaction paths overlapped (SD = .09%).
Main analysis.
As in the pilot study, a series of binomial models were composed and compared. e dependent variable was the proportion of negative responses. e predictors were a subset of either or both experimental conditions and the scores on the MAS and the GQ r , with age as a control variable. e scores on both questionnaires were centered in order to facilitate interpretation of the models. Chi-square statistics were calculated to assess if a proposed model was be er at predicting aggressive responses than the null model (which holds no predictors). e Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to compare the models amongst each other, with a lower AIC score indicating a be er t compared to the alternative model, and a di erence (∆ AI C ) of 2 points or less indicating the models are approximately equal [6] .
e rst model contained the two experimental conditions, an interaction term, and the control variable. In this model only age was a signi cant predictor, b = −.02, z = −2.30, p = .02. is model still outperformed the null model on predicting the number of aggressive responses,χ 2 (4, N = 117) = 10.13, p = .04; AIC = 594. 46 .
In the second model, the MAS was added as a main predictor and as a factor in the interaction term. is model returned main e ects *, **, and *** denote signi cance at p < .05, p < .01, and p < .001, respectively (two-tailed). Table 4 for the descriptives of both models.
Model interpretation.
e chosen model gets easier to interpret when the regression equations are wri en out for each of the four conditions. See Table 5 .
For the low anthropomorphic robot in the control condition, only age predicted aggression; for each additional year of the participants' age, the log odds of an aggressive response decreased with .02.
For the high anthropomorphic robot in the control condition, mind a ribution was a signi cant predictor of aggression as well; for every point that the MAS score was above the mean (i.e. the less mind was a ributed), the log odds of an aggressive response increased with .41. All else being equal, the low anthropomorphic robot in the power prime condition had a lower baseline rate of aggressive responses compared to the other conditions. e relationship between age, mind a ribution, and aggression was similar to the anthropomorphic robot in the control condition.
Finally, the overall lower rate of abuse of robots in the high anthropomorphism/control condition (Table 3) was not due to a lower baseline rate, but to a less strong e ect of mind a ribution on aggression.
DISCUSSION
As social robotics take up an increasingly prominent place in both science and society, the issue of robot abuse becomes more relevant. While a variety of scholars have observed abuse of both embodied [26, 53] and virtual [11, 61] agents, there is still very li le fundamental research on where this behaviour originates from.
e current studies took up a (social) psychology paradigm and investigated the in uence of anthropomorphism and dehumanisation on verbal abuse of a virtual robot. e hypotheses -dehumanisation leads to more aggression, an e ect that is enhanced by anthropomorphism -were partially con rmed. In the pilot study, while aggression was una ected by power and anthropomorphism, a lack of mind a ribution (an indication of dehumanisation) was directly related to abuse. In the main study, this e ect became moderated by feelings of power and anthropomorphism.
Against our expectations, priming participants with power failed to induce dehumanisation tendencies. Although the relationship between dehumanisation and robot bullying still could be studied by using the mind a ribution score that was originally intended as manipulation check, the e ect of power (null in the pilot and decreasing aggression in the main study) does raise some questions.
e most glaring question -did the prime actually manage to induce feelings of power in participants -cannot be tested with the data. However, the prime was adopted because of its solid previous establishment as inducing feelings of power [16, 17, 20] , and its in uence on behaviour in the current studies (albeit not through dehumanisation) indicates that something indeed was triggered.
If we assume for the moment that this was power, then why did power not in uence dehumanisation? How to explain the drop in aggressive tendencies a er being power-primed in the low anthropomorphism condition? And why did the power prime decrease the in uence of mind a ribution on aggression when the robot is anthropomorphic?
A potential explanation is that power worked as an inhibitor. Following this ratio, people bully robots out of uncertainty or perceived threat, as some sort of testing and probing. When they feel powerful, their dominance already feels established, which allows them to be friendlier. Indeed, Zlotowski et al. [68] recently found that the more autonomous a robot appeared to be, the more threatened people felt -a feeling that mediated the relationship between robot autonomy and participants' negative a itudes towards robots. Feelings of power in the current study may have reduced perceived autonomy in robots, or counteracted its moderation of negative a itudes through reducing the experienced threat.
is interpretation of the results provides an intriguing paradigm for future studies on robot abuse. Like the bullying of humans, robots bullying rests upon dehumanisation. But the power imbalance, which is so central in human-human abuse [60] , appears to take on a di erent role in human-robot abuse. Further investigating the interaction between power, perceived threat, dehumanisation, and abuse of robots would lead to deeper understanding of how exactly the human brain processes robots and could be of tremendous value to the eld of human-robot interaction.
Also interesting is the independence of anthropomorphism and dehumanisation, concepts that have been labelled each others reverse before [13, 22] . Humanlikeness in a robot did not in uence aggression or mind perception, but mind perception on itself was related to robot abuse. ese ndings match the work of Zlotowski et al. [68] , who found that robot appearance did not substantially in uence mind a ribution; and contradict the proposition that anthropomorphism and dehumanisation are simply two extremes of the same scale [as expressed by for example by 63] .
e presented ndings, albeit fundamental in nature, have implications for applied robotics as well. Of course, it would be far too early to recommend complicated robot behaviours designs that aim to reduce robot dehumanisation and enhance perceived power of the user; more elaborate studies, with embodied robots, are needed to pinpoint the exact relationship between dehumanisation, power, and robot bullying. However, considering the link between mind perception and aggression, one might consider giving priority to robot qualities that increase its perceived capability of thinking and feeling, over humanlikeness and aliveness.
e rst major limitation of the current studies is that it was conducted in a virtual environment. While this has its perks (e.g. the online disinhibition e ect), the current literature is undecided on whether this is entirely equatable to embodied robots [35, 45, 47, 59] ; the same goes for online versus o ine bullying [39, 42] . While we argue that the underlying psychological mechanisms are the same and the results can therefore be generalised, follow-up studies will have to empirically con rm that this is indeed the case.
Robot anthropomorphism was manipulated with minimal measures. On one hand, this allowed for a "cleaner" design, where it could be clear that it was anthropomorphism, and not for example perceived strength or size of the robot, that in uenced bullying behaviour. On the downside, the di erence in anthropomorphism between the conditions, although signi cant, is small.
Finally, as mentioned above, the dehumanisation manipulation was checked only by measuring mind a ribution, and not feelings of power. However, by adopting the instructions verbatim from successful studies in the main experiment, it seems less likely that a well-established prime suddenly failed to work than that it simply did not in uence mind a ribution. Nonetheless, in future studies inclusion a measurement of power might be considered as a second manipulation check.
e eld of human-robot interaction is very young, but has been around long enough to suggest that understanding the motivation behind robot abuse may prove to be no easier than understanding what drives people to pick on each other. Nonetheless, gaining insights on robot bullying will bene t both our understanding of the human mind as the development of an environment where a small cleaning robot can do its job without fear of being harrassed.
